



# 国际合作与贸易组织：国际事务中的决策

## 课题大纲

### 01

#### 课程背景及简介

**适合人群:** 本课程属于通识课程, 适合对国际政治与经济和国际关系感兴趣的同学。

**可持续发展目标目标 10: 减少不平等**

**可持续发展目标目标 17: 促进目标实现的伙伴关系**

国际组织是全球化的一个重要特征, 其数量在二战后稳步增长。尽管如此, 国际组织在全球体系中一直是有争议的角色。这门课程解释了国际合作面临的主要挑战。

该课程的重点是国际合作中的主要问题以及国际经济机构, 如世界贸易组织 (世贸组织) 在世界政治中的作用。课程分为五个模块: 前三个模块讨论了与国际合作有关的主要争论, 如霸权稳定理论、国内政治对国际合作的影响以及合作的有效性。第四个模块涵盖国际贸易机构, 我们将主要讨论世界贸易组织和优惠贸易协定的作用。第五个模块涉及国际货币基金组织 (IMF) 和世界银行 (World Bank), 教授会讲解这两家组织与有关经济发展的联系。如果学生曾经学习过国际关系课程, 则有益于对本课程的理解。

### 02

#### 学习目标

1. 熟悉国际合作的主要争论;
2. 对最重要的国际经济机构有全面的了解;
3. 能够理解和批判性地评价广泛使用的政治经济模型。

### 03

#### 导师信息

Prof. Baccini

现任麦吉尔大学政治学院副教授, 曾获麦吉尔大学年度教授奖、2022 年迈克尔·沃勒斯坦最佳文章奖。教授的研究领域为: 研究国际关系、国际政治经济学、比较政治经济学、国际贸易和国际组织等。教授曾与哥伦比亚大学的 Johannes Urpelainen 合作著书《解决经济改革的棘手问题: 国际机构何时及如何提供帮助》, 曾任斯坦福大学格伦·坎贝尔和丽塔·里卡多·坎贝尔国家研究员和欧盟 Jean Monnet 研究员 (2019-2020), 并应邀在耶鲁大学、牛津大学、斯坦福大学、普林斯顿大学、伦敦大学学院等知名大学讲座。

### 04

#### 课程设置

##### 模块 1: 无政府状态下的合作

学习目标: 合作的原因; 霸权稳定性理论

课程描述: 学生将运用基本的博弈论模型, 学习与国际合作相关的主要问题。此外, 该模块还涵盖了霸权稳定理论及其不足之处。

##### 模块 2: 谈判与执行

学习目标: 各国要加入国际协定及遵守国际协定的原因

课程描述: 本模块涵盖了国际合作的谈判和执行阶段, 并举例说明了贸易、人权和安全。

##### 模块 3: 国内政治与国际合作

学习目标: 利益集团; 境内机构

课程描述：该模块展示了国内政治如何影响国际合作，特别关注贸易自由化。

模块 4：贸易合作

学习目标：世贸组织；优惠贸易协定

课程描述：该模块涵盖了世界贸易组织和优惠贸易协定，探索这些国际机构的原因和后果。

模块 5：国际货币基金组织和世界银行

学习目标：IMF 的有限性；世界银行和援助分配

课程描述：本模块调查了国际货币基金组织和世界银行的相关文献，重点是它们与各国在经济发展和地缘战略利益上的联系，并与学生共同研讨文献。

05

延伸阅读

Module 1:

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Model 3:

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